Yes, but are you certain?
Details
THE VENUE: Caffè Nero, Fitzroy St
We meet upstairs at Caffè Nero in Fitzroy St, near to the Grafton Centre and opposite the old Wilko store. An organiser will be present from 10.45.
We are not charged for use of the space so it would be good if everyone bought at least one drink.
An attendee limit has been set so as not to overwhelm the venue.
Etiquette
Our discussions are friendly and open. We are a discussion group, not a for-and-against debating society. But it helps if we try to stay on topic. And we should not talk over others, interrupt them, or try to dominate the conversation.
WhatsApp groups
We have two WhatsApp groups. One is to notify events, including extra events such as meeting for a meal or a drink during the week which we don't normally put on the Meetup site. The other is for open discussion of whatever topics occur to people. If you would like to join either or both groups, please send a note of the phone number you would like to use to Richard Baron on:
website.audible238@passmail.net (This is an alias that can be discarded if it attracts spam, hence the odd words.)
THE TOPIC: Yes, but are you certain?
This week's topic has been provide by Duncan.
We feel varying degrees of certainty about all sorts of things. In some cases we may be able to justify our certainty, while in others it's just a strong feeling. Objective certainty seems to be desirable in many situations but it may not always be as necessary as we think.
Psychologists and philosophers disagree slightly about the nature of certainty. The psychologist is interested in the individual's belief in relation to the matter at hand, whereas some philosophers think we can find a more objective definition.
We may feel objectively certain about something based on the information we have at that time, but revise our position (perhaps reluctantly) when more data is received. Our certainty may be grounded on the advice of an expert in the matter (as we discussed recently).
Proponents of philosophical skepticism may deny that certainty is possible, or claim that it is only possible in domains such as logic or mathematics. Many philosophers have held that knowledge requires epistemic certainty, and therefore that one must have infallible justification in order to count as knowing the truth of a proposition. (e.g. “I am certain that all bachelors are unmarried”).
A radical skeptic may say that if knowledge requires absolute certainty, then knowledge is most likely impossible, as evidenced by the apparent fallibility of our beliefs.
Many philosophers such as René Descartes were troubled by the resulting skeptical implications, since all of our experiences at least seem to be compatible with various skeptical scenarios.
It is generally accepted now that most of our beliefs are compatible with their falsity and are therefore fallible, although the status of being certain is still often ascribed to a limited range of beliefs (such as "I exist"). The apparent fallibility of our beliefs has led many contemporary philosophers to deny that knowledge requires certainty.
The law enumerates a number of degrees of certainty, such as 'beyond reasonable doubt', and may convict an individual on that basis. 'Undoubtable' is recognised as an impossible standard to meet.
So, can you say you 'know' something unless you are completely certain? Or is it just shorthand for saying: "I know, based on the evidence I have available, and I may (or may not) change my mind at any time if new evidence comes to light" ? Or should we be more epistemically 'honest' and never claim certainty about anything ?
Are the claims "it's raining" and "I'm certain it's raining" equivalent, making the certainty redundant ? Or does the certainty add something ?
We might also discuss the nature of religious faith and the justifications provided for the existence of God.
The IEP has a relevant entry: https://iep.utm.edu/certainty/, as does the SEP: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/certainty/
